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THE LAW AND PSYCHIATRY WARS, 1960 - 1980*
SHELDON GELMAN"
Neuroleptic or "antipsychotic" medications appeared during the early
1950s; they are now in their fifth decade of use, perhaps a longevity record
for a prevailing psychiatric treatment. By the early 1960s, psychiatrists and
policy makers were hailing the drugs and their potential for transforming
the public mental health system In short order, medications replaced psy-
chiatric treatments such as insulin coma therapy and lobotomy, and they
soon became the standard therapy for schizophrenia. Many hailed them as a
"biological revolution" in psychiatry.
A parallel revolution occurred in law. By the late 1960s, courts were
declaring civil commitment schemes and aspects of state mental hospital
management unconstitutional. This represented a dramatic departure, for
until then public mental health matters had been decided by state adminis-
trators and statutes, not by judges or the federal Constitution. Advocates
and opponents alike likened the litigation over mental hospitals (in its am-
bitions, theories, and judicial demands) to lawsuits directed at racial segre-
gation in public schools.
In the wake of the twin legal and psychiatric revolutions, the century-
old network of state mental hospitals withered. If the hospitals exist at all
today, they are only a fraction of their 1950 size, and their function has
completely changed. Now state hospitals do little more than adjust or rein-
stitute medication regimens, and possibly care for some patients who re-
spond to medications badly. "Community care" and community medication
-"liberty" in legal terms-have taken the hospitals' place in the public
mental health system.
On any view of developments, medications loom large. Yet their actual
role receives relatively little scrutiny. Psychiatrists generally assume that
the changes wrought by medications represent fruits of scientific and medi-
cal progress, and that little more than that need be said. Similarly, many
lawyers assume that the state hospital litigation spurred moral and legal
progress-though perhaps not as much as one would have liked. Obvious
problems in the new public health system (homelessness, neglect, under-
treatment, new burdens on family members, revolving door hospitalizations,
* This essay will appear in the author's forthcoming book and is reprinted with permission
of Rutgers University Press. SHELDON GELMAN (untitled) (forthcoming 1998).
.. Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; J.D., Rutgers, Newark; LL.M., Harvard.
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and the occasional act of violence by a dangerous mentally ill person) usu-
ally get attributed to failures of implementation, planning, or funding; few
regard them as inherent in the legal or psychiatric revolutions that pro-
duced the new system. These are standard views in psychiatry and law, but
I believe they err in important ways. The essay that follows is excerpted
from a book to be published by Rutgers University Press."" The book exam-
ines the medication era in detail, and argues that the very conception of
medications as a revolutionary treatment, and psychiatric ideas about their
side effects and mechanism of action, all have a history--a history at odds
with the idea that pure medical discovery drove developments.
Leading psychiatrists wanted an end to the old state hospital system in
the 1950s. They also wanted to close the book on their profession's recent
history (e.g., lobotomy) and its growing public and medical disrepute. In
short, they wanted a revolution (in public health, in public perception and in
their profession). But if medications worked as lobotomy had, by inducing
pathology in patients (and many 1950s' psychiatrists thought medications
did so) or if the medications caused permanent neurological disorders (as
they do) these revolutions might well not occur. The public likely would
have objected, as would have other physicians and courts, to a program of
inducing pathology in patients on a massive scale and then discharging
them from mental hospitals. After all, lobotomy induced pathology and as a
result the public had turned against the therapy and, to no small extent,
against psychiatry.
The desired public health and psychiatric revolutions occurred when
leading researchers excluded pathology from their account of how medica-
tions worked, and ignored medications' persistent neurological side effects.
Both of those things happened in the early 1960s, at just about the same
time the federal government was endorsing deinstitutionalization. The book
shows that these understandings of medications did not result from data (in
the case of side effects, obvious data were suddenly ignored) but did con-
form to psychiatrists' vision of public health and their profession. Far from
"science " or "progress" driving social and public health developments, it
appears that at crucial junctures the "science" of medications reflected so-
cial and public health choices, not medical discovery or insight.
The chapter of the book excerpted below reaches similar conclusions
about the law. It examines litigation developments from the late 1960s to
the early 1980s. In law no less than in psychiatry, professional judgments
produced anomalous results and professional processes worked in unex-
pected ways when it came to medications. These departures advanced a
public mental health vision that was functionally the same as psychiatrists',
even if couched in utterly different and more legalistic terms. Psychiatrists
hailed medications as a medical revolution; lawyers by and large ignored
the drugs. Yet, both professions reached the same general conclusions
... The material will appear in a somewhat different form in the book.
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about what should be done.
Commentators at the time saw an emerging "war" between law and
psychiatry. However, the combat metaphor seems particularly ill chosen.
Viewed in retrospect, the two disciplines' relationship seems like a ritual-
ized dance-one marked by forceful gestures and occasional separation of
the two partners, but always in response to the same music.
I. RIGHT TO TREATMENT
From the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, mental hospital reform liti-
gation captured the imagination of lawyers and of the public. So-called
"right to treatment" cases sought massive changes in state mental hospitals,
and coincided with major changes in public mental health. By 1980, state
mental hospitals had substantially given way to a new system of adminis-
tering medications in the "community."'
Without doubt, ample injustices warranted hospital reform litigation.
Mental hospital life was often bleak, punctuated by violence, incompetent
treatment, and abuse. In principle, the lawsuits challenging these conditions
need not have comported with the emerging deinstitutionalization ideal.
Yet they did. The right to treatment cases typically produced a rapid
reduction in the population of hospitals. Downsizing might not have been an
explicit demand of the lawsuits, but it was widely recognized as a principal
objective of the attorneys who brought the cases. Some lawyers hoped for
the complete disappearance of state mental hospitals.2 Often enough, the
patients' lawyers and the defendant mental health department pursued the
same deinstitutionalization objectives, with the only real opposition coming
from mental hospital physicians and hospital unions, whose jobs were at
risk. Even if the patients' lawyers began with other aims, acquiescing in
deinstitutionalization assured them a "victory" that could justify their major
litigation effort. This victory was always within reach because the principal
1. See generally George E. Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in its 20th Year, 181
SCIENCE 124 (1973) [hereinafter Clinical Psychopharmacology] (setting forth the classic ac-
count of deinstitutionalization and medications); Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs:
Professionalism and the Constitution, 72 GEo. L.J. 1725, 1725-30, 1750-52 (1984)
[hereinafter Mental Hospital Drugs] (describing deinstitutionalization); PHIL BROVN, THE
TRANSFER OF CARE: PSYCHIATRIC DE3NSTIUIONALIZATION AND ITS AFrERMATH (1985)
(describing and analyzing developments); ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE
TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTruTIONALIZATION (1990) (describing and analyzing developments).
2. See ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
870 (1974) (describing "what is perceived as the basic strategy of... [the prototype right
treatment case]" as "requir[ing] ... a standard of care that would be so difficult for most
states to meet that it would be necessary to release large numbers of patients from state hos-
pitals in order that the patients remaining would receive adequate treatment."). See also
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Liber-
tarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 403 (1982) (noting that "[t]he civil libertarian approach
has been dominant' and it leads attorneys to prefer the "remedy of release for many patients"
in right to treatment litigation).
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defendants favored it. So lawyers claimed credit for what the states had
wanted all along; and lawsuits provided political "cover" for states bent on
releasing mental patients into sometimes reluctant communities.
Right to treatment lawsuits were almost always settled, and along just
such lines. Still, some of the details sometimes provoked bitter controversy.
Lawyers typically sought substantial improvements in the hospitals' physi-
cal plant, staffing levels, interior furnishings and programs, even as the hos-
pital census fell. Those things required funding, but the states generally
wished to spend less, not more. Real differences also arose over the timing
of any improvements (lawyers generally wanted it faster) and about the
closeness of any subsequent judicial supervision? Yet none of these disa-
greements altered the decrees' fundamental alignment with deinstitutionali-
zation. If court decrees required improved staff-patient ratios, for example,
discharging patients would help bring that about.
Though supposedly comprehensive in scope (even the temperature of
shower water received attention in the decrees) right to treatment lawsuits
effectively ignored medication issues. A typical consent decree might bar
lobotomy (which the hospital hadn't performed in years), include a right to
refuse electroconvulsive therapy (which state hospitals rarely used at this
point), and then cite a vague right against "excessive" or "unnecessary"
medication.4 These medication provisions did not produce results, and it is
not even clear what hospitals were supposed to do differently. No physician
had ever characterized his or her prescription as "excessive" or
"unnecessary," and nothing in the decrees would change that. Later in the
decade, decrees included hospital pharmacy reforms or standards that dis-
couraged the prescription of more than one medication at a time. Whatever
they accomplished, these measures did not prevent hospitals from adminis-
tering medications to almost all patients and producing widespread side ef-
fects.
This lack of attention to medications was remarkable. Many mental
patients intensely dislike medications, and notoriously complain about
them. Two leading researchers documented the reasons for this in 1974.'
They conducted an experiment in which patients received a "test dose" of
the drugs. Sixty percent experienced a "euphoric" or pleasant response;
forty percent, a "dysphoric" or unpleasant one.6 Almost a quarter of this
3. See, e.g., Michael S. Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VIC-
TORIES AND HARD REALTIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSnITrTONAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie Bradley & Gary Clarke, eds. 1976)
(reviewing decisions and recent settlements and expressing concern about the pace and
"reality" of court mandated change).
4. The prototype for numerous decrees was Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972).
5. See Theodore Van Patten & Philip R.A. May, Subjective Response as a Predictor of Out-
come in Pharmacotherapy: The Consumer has a Point, 35 ARcHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477
(1978).
6. Id. at 478.
[Vol. 34
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forty percent "had such a severe dysphoric response that they [immediately]
refused further treatment. '7 The researchers continued:
Can we assure a patient with an early dysphoric response that he will "get
used to" the medication? Apparently not: 88% of the dysphoric respond-
ers eventually refused to continue taking [medications] because of a per-
sisting dysphoria, against only 23% of the euphoric responders. ....[M]ost [dysphoric responders]... compiained throughout their treat-
ment.., of feeling "drugged," of having 'no drive or ambition," of being
"drowsy," "tired," and "slowed up."
'
For good or ill, medications dominate patients' feelings and experi-
ences of life in the mental hospital. Attorneys supposedly represented their
clients' views. Thus, patients' dislike of the medications should have com-
manded lawyers' attention. Yet in the early and mid-1970s, lawyers virtu-
ally never pressed complaints about medications; it was as if they were in-
visible.
In fact, attorneys had more reason to question medications than patients
did themselves. In 1967, a research psychiatrist named George Crane dem-
onstrated that tardive dyskinesia (a syndrome of repetitive, purposeless
movements affecting various parts of the body, but especially the mouth,
jaw, and tongue) affected about twenty five percent of medicated patients.
Crane also showed that the disorder probably resulted from medications,
and that it usually persisted after medications were withdrawn. That per-
sistence, and an uncanny resemblance between tardive dyskinesia and the
aftermath of a virulent type of brain encephalitis, suggested that medications
caused long-lasting neurological damage.9
Upon hearing Crane's findings, leading psychiatrists criticized him on a
variety of mistaken and inconsistent grounds. Patients did not manifest the
movements Crane had reported; or the patients did have the movements, but
medications did not cause them; or medications caused the movements, but
they were reversible and not serious; or the movements existed and were not
reversible, but prior lobotomies and other brain damage were ultimately re-
sponsible. These psychiatrists criticized Crane as a threat to "progress in
psychiatry," and most of their brethren simply ignored the problem.1
Yet Crane was basically right. In fact, he had underestimated tardive
dyskinesia's prevalence. By the time right to treatment litigation blossomed
in the early 1970s, tardive dyskinesia's relationship to medications enjoyed
7. Id
S. Id. at 479.
9. See George E. Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia in Schizophrenic Patients Treated With
Psychotropic Drugs, in SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON AcTIoN, MECHANISM AND
METABousM OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS DERIVED FROM PHENOTHIAZINE AND STRUCTURALLY
RELATED COMPOuNDS 209 (1967) [hereinafter Tardive Dyskinesia]. For discussion, see Gel-
man, Mental Hospital Drugs, supra note 1, at 1753 & n.136.
10. Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia, supra note 9, at 218 (recording the "emergency discus-
sion" that followed Crane's paper).
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wide recognition among researchers, even though leading psychiatrists still
systematically underestimated the number of affected patients. These psy-
chiatrists, like Crane's earliest critics, realized that tardive dyskinesia car-
ried powerful implications for medication practice, and that its occurrence
might undercut public support for the new public health system."
With widespread tardive dyskinesia, medications arguably took on the
legally salient characteristics of lobotomy, a procedure that had raised grave
legal and moral questions. Lobotomy produced permanent neurological
damage; now medications did so as well. Lobotomy worked in largely un-
known ways, and so did medications (the popularity of the theory that medi-
cations redressed a "chemical brain imbalance" notwithstanding). Moreo-
ver, the discoverer of the first antipsychotic drug, Thorazine, had theorized
that it worked something like lobotomy by inducing a brain disease in pa-
tients (a disease whose symptoms closely resembled what psychiatrists later
called "tardive dyskinesia"). In the 1950s, leading psychiatrists had even
described medications as "chemical lobotomies."' 3
It is true that the late 1960s and early 1970s were the heyday of overly
favorable research views of medications. Leading psychiatrists systemati-
cally downplayed side effects and exaggerated benefits in ways that had lit-
tie support in data, and that later proved indefensible. 4 Yet ample reason
existed to challenge those categorizations when right to treatment litigation
got underway, for example, in the work of 1950s psychiatrists, and of Crane
and other tardive dyskinesia researchers. Indeed, as early as 1965, an edito-
rial in the Journal of the American Medical Association had cautioned phy-
sicians about the danger of permanent neurological damage from medica-
tions. 5 In 1973, a prestigious task force of government, academic and
pharmaceutical industry psychiatrists had acknowledged tardive dyskine-
sia's existence, and drug companies added the disorder to their list of side
effects.' 6 All of this had obvious legal and moral implications, which lead-
11. See Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, supra note 1, at 1753-54. More extensive ar-
guments on these points will appear in my forthcoming book. See SHELDON GELMAN
(untitled) (forthcoming 1998).
12. See Pierre Deniker, Experimental Neurological Syndromes and the New Drug
Therapies in Psychiatry, 1 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 92 (1961) (arguing that drugs' clini-
cal benefits probably result from a brain syndrome).
13. Sidney Malitz et al., A Two-Year Evaluation of Chlorpromazine in Clinical Research
and Practice, 113 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 540, 543 (1956) (noting that psychiatrists had called
medications a "chemical lobotomy" and disagreeing with that usage-because medications
did not work as well as lobotomy for many patients).
14. These claims receive considerable attention in the book. Research that played a piv-
otal role in constructing the new view of medications was published as The National Institute
of Mental Health Psychopharmacology Service Center Collaborative Study Group, Phenothi-
azine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARcHIvES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246 (1964).
15. See Editorial, Irreversible Side Effects of Phenothiazines, 191 JAMA 333 (1965).
16. See Am. College of Neuropsychopharmacology-FDA Task Force, Neurological
Syndromes Associated With Anti-psychotic Drug Use, A Special Report, 28 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 463 (1973).
[Vol. 34
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ing psychiatrists presumably recognized as they devised an overly optimis-
tic picture of medications. Yet if psychiatrists recognized the implications,
lawyers and courts did not-not in right to treatment suits and, a half decade
later, not even in the first wave of right to refuse medication suits.
Nor were medications' benefits as great, or as universal, as clinicians
usually supposed. Hospital staff thought it self-evident that virtually every
patient relapsed when medications were withdrawn, and that virtually no
patient relapsed on a proper dose. Such beliefs were simply unfounded.
Many patients do not relapse off drugs, at least over periods of up to two
years, and many patients do relapse on medications. Almost all seriously
mentally ill persons receive medications, George Crane noted in 1973, even
though "fewer than 50 percent of patients hospitalized for several years im-
prove in response" and even though drugs' capacity to forestall relapse,
while significant, was not overwhelming." Crane observed that "60 to 70
percent of acute schizophrenics on no drugs are readmitted [to hospitals]
within 1 year, while only 20 to 30 percent receiving some form of drug ther-
apy require rehospitalization within 1 year."'8 Thus, thirty to forty percent
did not relapse within in a year despite their medication free status, while
twenty to thirty percent did relapse in that same period, despite medica-
tions. 9
It is difficult to see how lawyers could dismiss Crane's views, espe-
cially since he had formulated them while a researcher at NIMH. His views
also accurately reflected existing literature. In 1976, Jonathan Cole (who
was perhaps the country's leading medication researcher) and George Gar-
dos examined relapse rates among medicated and placebo-treated outpa-
tients. They concluded that "perhaps as many as 50% of such patients
might not be worse off if their medications were withdrawn. In view of the
long-term complications of antipsychotic drug therapy-primarily tardive
dyskinesia-an attempt should be made to determine the feasibility of drug
discontinuance in every patient.""0
Cole and Gardos also stated that "even in the most stable groups, a
number of patients could be saved from the dangers of tardive dyskinesia as
well as from the financial and social burdens of prolonged drug therapy"2'
by adhering to the "major principle" that "every chronic schizophrenic out-
patient maintained on antipsychotic medication should have the benefit of
an adequate trial without drugs."2
The same principle applied with greater force outside of community
settings, to chronic patients within mental hospitals. As a group, these pa-
17. Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology, supra note 1, at 125.
18. Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology, supra note 1, at 125.
19. See Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology, supra note 1, at 125.
20. George Gardos & Jonathan Cole, Maintenance Antipsychotic Therapy: Is the Cure
Worse than the Disease? 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 32, 36 (1976).
21. Hd at 34.
22. IL at 35 (emphasis in original).
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ients did not respond well to medications. If they did, they would not have
become chronic and remained hospitalized in the first place. Moreover, re-
lapses posed less danger in hospitals where patients had constant supervi-
sion. For these reasons, psychiatrists had identified chronic inpatients as
prime candidates for drug withdrawal ever since the discovery of tardive
dyskinesia.' Yet right to treatment suits failed to address the practice of
medicating nearly all chronic patients.
The litigation proceeded as though Crane's critics, and clinicians who
prescribed medications indiscriminately, were right. Right to treatment de-
crees required adequate ventilation, clean kitchens, and functioning hospital
pharmacies, but never seriously questioned every patient's need for medica-
tions. Medications constituted both the engine of deinstitutionalization, and
the dominant force in the lives of patients and mental hospitals. Yet sup-
posedly comprehensive "right to treatment" suits managed to pay almost no
attention to them.
George Crane himself described the results. As an expert witness,
Crane later examined patients in Wyatt v. Stickney,2' the first class action
right to treatment lawsuit. Wyatt had created the right to treatment reform
case, and became the prototype for almost innumerable other lawsuits. A
half decade after the Wyatt decision gave patients a right to be free of
"excessive or unnecessary medication," Crane visited the affected hospitals
and found a miserable situation regarding medications.'
The trial record in Rennie v. Klein illustrated the problems that existed
throughout the United States.26 Thousands of patients, and five New Jersey
state hospitals, were involved in this litigation. By the time of trial, in the
late 1970s, tardive dyskinesia had supposedly become a matter of grave
23. See, e.g., Frank J. Ayd, Persistent Dyskinesia-A Further Report, INT'L. DRUG
THERAPY NEvsL=rER, May 1967, at 19 ("the benefits of high doses, particularly in chroni-
cally ill patients over 40 years of age, in most instances, are so dubious that instead of pre-
scribing high doses, treatment of another sort should be employed"); see also AMERIcAN
PsYcIATRIc Ass'N, TAPrDIVE DYSKINESiA: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC TAsK
FORCE ON LATE NEUROLOGICAL EFFEcrs OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS 170 (1980) (describing
"chronically hospitalized" patients as a "special case" that calls for "at least yearly, and pref-
erably, twice yearly re-evaluations off neuroleptic medications"-- to be achieved by reducing
the dosage steadily until signs of relapse reappear or the dose reaches zero).
24. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
25. Crane examined the patients as an expert witness for the United States Justice De-
partment, which was litigating the Wyatt case at that point. To date, I have been unable to
obtain Crane's deposition in that case, but he characterized his findings to me at the time in a
personal communication. Earlier, the Department of Justice had asked me to recommend a
potential expert witness on medication issues, and I gave them Crane's name.
26. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978). I was the trial and appellate at-
torney during most of the Rennie case, and the trial record consists largely of evidence that I
introduced. The account that follows comports with the trial judge's findings. It is also
worth noting that neither the defendants nor the American Psychiatric Association (which
participated as an anicus in the appeals) disputed this account of what New Jersey doctors
actually did. Instead, the American Psychiatric Association suggested that New Jersey's state
hospitals were uniquely bad ones.
[Vol. 34
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psychiatric concern. Yet until that point, no state hospital physician in New
Jersey had ever acknowledged a case of tardive dyskinesia. Two official re-
views of the question (one by physicians at the state's medical school in
1974, which responded to public charges by social workers that tardive
dyskinesia existed in the hospitals, and one by officials of the mental health
department during the lawsuit) concluded that no New Jersey patient had
tardive dyskinesia?
Testifying as an expert witness, Crane described the results of his own
examination of hundreds of New Jersey patients and their charts. About one
in four showed at least moderate symptoms of tardive dyskinesia, but no
case was diagnosed. Beyond that, patient charts rarely even mentioned the
symptoms (often bizarre movements) even when severe. In one case, for
example, numerous parts of the patient's body were affected. Yet only a
month before Crane's examination, a hospital neurologist had reported no
symptoms or abnormalities. Nor had another examination found anything
wrong, even though it was conducted in response to the lawsuit and was
specifically designed to detect tardive dyskinesia."
Some hospital psychiatrists were undoubtedly incompetent and even
unaware of tardive dyskinesia. But, the situation that Crane described re-
quired systematic efforts to avoid reporting the disorder. Physicians truly
ignorant about tardive dyskinesia would have been struck by a patient's
grotesque movements, and would have described them in patient charts.
Yet, that rarely happened. Evidently, physicians knew precisely which
symptoms not to notice or record.
On a few occasions, physicians did acknowledge the bizarre move-
ments. For example, this would occur when relatives had complained about
them, or, as happened in one case, when grotesque movements precluded a
life for the patient outside of the hospital, and nothing else was wrong with
him. In these instances, physicians attributed the bizarre symptoms to
"nerves" or "faking." Both responses were indefensible; a patient could
hardly "fake" such a disorder for every minute of his or her waking life (and
would hardly bother, in any event, since the hospital never acknowledged
tardive dyskinesia in the first place).
Physicians' responses varied when faced with other side effects such as
tremor and stiffness, or nervousness and extreme restlessness. Physicians
often administered a second medication to ameliorate the problem, assum-
ing they had noticed it. If the symptoms did not respond to this second
drug, doctors usually handled the matter as they did tardive dyskinesia; they
denied the problem's existence, attributed it to nerves, or pronounced it
"faking." There was no evidence that doctors recognized the possibility of a
27. See Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging-Atomistic and Structural Reme-
dies, 32 CLEV. ST. L. Ray. 221, 233 (1983) [hereinafter Remedies]. This article includes ci-
tations to the Rennie trial record.
28. See id. at 233.
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patient responding to medications with distress.
These responses typified state hospital practice in the United States.
Crane had inspected hospitals in various states, and testified that New Jer-
sey's hospitals were representative 0 The Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals had accredited New Jersey's state institutions: it appar-
entiy found nothing remarkable about the institutions' medication practices,
or about their claim (reported on accreditation forms) of a zero tardive
dyskinesia rate." Moreover, New Jersey's practice followed the path laid
down by leading psychiatric researchers, who had ignored tardive dyskine-
sia and other side effects starting in the early 1960s.'
The language about "unnecessary medication" and "excessive medica-
tion" in right to treatment decrees was boilerplate that did not relate to ac-
tual problems. For example, no decree purported to judge "excess" by con-
sidering a patient's side effects. And every decree implicitly presumed that
medications were necessary" (or at the least, not "unnecessary") no matter
what a patient's actual response. Had courts and lawyers taken medications
seriously (as they presumably would have if, for example, a form of brain
surgery produced the identical profile of benefits and risks), the language of
the decrees would have been obviously inadequate. (Imagine a decree that
protected only against "unnecessary" and "excessive" brain surgery, or how
hospitals would have understood such a decree during the heyday of lobot-
omy in 1949).
Under the classic model of attorney-client relationships, attorneys voice
their clients' concerns. That did not happen in the right to treatment cases
because one of the patients' principal complaints-medications-was ef-
fectively ignored. Beyond acting as their clients' voices, some attorneys
also posit an obligation to safeguard a mentally ill client's real interests.
Adding that element of paternalism to the mix still does not explain why
right to treatment litigation ignored medications; many patients had good
reason to complain, whether they actually did so or not. Nor does it explain
why issues that were receiving attention among psychiatric researchers
(tardive dyskinesia and patients who did not benefit from medications)
played no role in the lawsuits. In fact, lawyers were ignoring the very
things about medications that mental hospital clinicians ignored as they pre-
scribed the drugs.
Lawyers and courts also ignored medications in the realm of legal the-
29. See Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, supra note 1, at 1757-60 (reviewing the litiga-
tion record and the available literature on management of other side effects).
30. See Gelman, Remedies, supra note 27, at 230-31.
31. Seeid. at230, 233.
32. My forthcoming book documents these developments in detail. See GELMAN, supra
note 11. For a classic account of psychiatry's response to tardive dyskinesia, see Crane,
Clinical Psychophannacology, supra note 1. See also Phil Brown & Steven C. Funk,
Tardive Dyskinesia: Barriers to the Professional Recognition of an latrogenic Disease, 27 J.
HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 116 (1986) (accepting much of Crane's account); and Gelman,
Mental Hospital Drugs, supra note 1, at 1752-60 (describing developments).
[Vol. 34
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ory. During this period, courts understood a "right to treatment" as requir-
ing either "minimally adequate" mental hospital treatment or, in a more
generous version of the right, "such individual treatment as will give...
[patients] a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve... [their]
mental condition."33 To sustain a right to treatment claim, then, attorneys
had to prove that a particular hospital did not administer minimal or reason-
able treatment. Yet nearly all patients received medications; and, according
to leading researchers at this time, drugs constituted a revolutionary and
truly "antischizophrenic" therapy. Such claims were seriously inflated, but
presumably the attorneys did not know that. Even cautious psychiatrists re-
garded medications as very effective treatment for moderating psychotic
symptoms. They believed medications to be, by far, the best available ther-
apy.
Given such conclusions, medications alone should have qualified as a
treatment that afforded patients "a reasonable opportunity to... improve. '
Thus, claims of a "right to treatment" violation should have failed because
almost every patient received the drugs. At the same time, it does not ap-
pear that lawyers or courts considered medications ineffective; had they be-
lieved such a thing, attorneys surely would have objected vociferously.
Medications would have been a useless treatment that many patients dis-
liked, and that in fact caused considerable harm. So it was not that medica-
tions seemed ineffective. Rather, they became like the air that patients
breathed--ever present in mental hospitals, indispensable, but worthy only
of passing legal comment.
Had they recognized medications as a constitutionally adequate
"treatment," courts still would not have left mental hospitals entirely alone.
An important component of right to treatment decrees dealt with patient
safety (the physical environment in the hospital, the quality of ordinary
medical services, violence) rather than with treatment as such. These safety
concerns would have remained pressing even if medications constituted
adequate "treatment." What would have become virtually unsustainable,
however, were the demands for additional therapeutic staff, new programs,
more "therapeutic" environments, etc. Those very things had lent right to
treatment litigation a revolutionary air, and, not incidentally, had added to
the cost of complying with judicial decrees.35
These "treatment" aspects of court decrees also had important ideologi-
33. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
34. Id. at 520.
35. In 1982, the Supreme Court drew the distinction between safety and treatment. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 307 (1982). Romeo recognized a minimal right to
safety in hospitals, but also cast doubt on the existence of a constitutional right to treatment
apart from issues of safety and physical liberty. The Romeo Court powerfully discouraged
any further mental hospital reform litigation. However, the Court left open the possibility
that additional therapy might be constitutionally required in a particular case if it allowed the
patient to enjoy a greater decree of liberty or safety.
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cal implications. The lawsuits generally produced or coincided with rapid
deinstitutionalization, as noted above. "Right to treatment" claims made that
development appear legitimate. It was one thing to release patients as part
of a process of upgrading treatment. It would have been another thing to
discharge some patients simply in order to make mental hospitals safer for
others. Yet, that would have been true if the lawsuits had sought only safety
and not treatment. In the latter case, obvious questions arise about the rights
and well-being of those discharged. With "treatment" such questions re-
main beneath the surface. "Treatment" related deinstitutionalization
sounded like progress where "safety" related deinstitutionalization would
have sounded like "dumping" or, at best, triage.
The right to treatment need not have developed as it did, and had ap-
peared very differently at its birth, a decade earlier. The right was the
brainchild of Morton Birnbaum, a lawyer-physician, who proposed it in a
1960 article for the American Bar Association Journal." Birnbaum did so
because he thought that state hospitals would remain the centerpieces of the
public mental health system, and that medications would not significantly
change matters. Thus, he believed that hospital staffing ratios, physician
attention to patients, hospital programming and the like constituted the pa-
tients' only real medical hope.
Birnbaum presumed that medications did not represent a revolutionary
treatment. He quoted at length from an article by another physician de-
ploring the tendency to discharge patients more rapidly from hospitals be-
cause of medications. That happened, according to the quotation, despite
the fact that many "patients continue to relapse and return to hospitals as be-
fore" and that many other patients "remain in their communities but are un-
able to adapt adequately even though their more disturbing symptoms are no
longer present."'37 The quote concluded with a plea not to overvalue medi-
cations or undervalue hospitals:
Until we know a lot more about so-called mental disease and until we can
treat the total person more successfully, let us continue to improve upon
what we are able to do and not measure success by chemically induced
tranquillity and the rate at which we discharge patients from our hospi-
talsY3
In case any doubt remained, Birnbaum added the following observa-
tions of his own:
Although it is hoped that new methods of treatment will be discovered
that will allow a valid [ethical?] rapid increase in the discharge rate of the
institutionalized mentally ill, at present, it appears that no such methods
36. Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A3.A.L 499 (1960).
37. Id. at 501 (quoting Sands, Discharges from Mental Hospitals, 115 AM. J. PsY-
ciATRY 748 (1959).
38. Id.
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are on the horizon; therefore, it should be assumed that the need for more
personnel and physical facilities will continue to exist.3
Bimbaum's positions were completely transformed in right to treatment
litigation, however. He had paid medications relatively little attention be-
cause he did not think they would (or, more precisely, that they should) pro-
duce dramatic changes. A decade later, attorneys paid medications virtually
no attention even as the treatment was revolutionizing the mental health
system, and after their serious side effects had become known. Unlike
Birnbaum, reform attorneys generally hoped that more patients would be
discharged into the community which they regarded as a state of "liberty."
Again, unlike Bimbaum, the reform attorneys were unconcerned that dein-
stitutionalization resulted from the practice of medicating virtually every
patient. Effectively turned upside down, Birnbaum's right became a means
of advancing the very deinstitutionalization and medication objectives that
he had deplored.
Birnbaum's idea got turned upside down in another way as well. Not
foreseeing class actions and injunctions as the means of enforcing the right,
he had proposed something more modest: allowing individual patients to
obtain their release from a mental hospital on the ground that it had violated
their "right to treatment." Birnbaum realized that this remedy conceivably
could result in the release of the very patients he thought needed hospitali-
zation. It was "[a]dmittedly... radical," he wrote, "[t]o release a mentally
ill person who requires further institutionalization, solely because he is not
being given proper care and treatment." 4 Doing so "may endanger the
health and welfare of many members of the community as well as the health
and welfare of the sick person. 41 Birnbaum continued:
[HI]owever, it should always be remembered that the entire danger to, and
from, the mentally ill that may occur by releasing them while they still re-
quire further institutionalization can be removed simply by our society
treating these sick people properly. This is an important reason why the
right to treatment is being advocated. For if repeated court decisions con-
stantly remind the public that medical care in public mental institutions is
inadequate, not only will the mentally ill be released from their mental
prisons, but, it is believed that public opinion will react to force the legis-
latures to increase appropriations sufficiently to make it possible to pro-
vide adequate care and treatment......
In the end, however, the right to treatment upended this expectation of
its creator too. Not only did a legal construct premised on the inadequacy of
medications and the necessity of mental hospitals become a legal instrument
for replacing hospitals with a system of "community" medication, but a
39. Birnbawn, supra note 36, at 501.
40. Id. at 503.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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right designed to trigger public outrage over the release of patients did the
opposite. As actually deployed, the right to treatment made wholesale dein-
stitutionalization seem progressive, a happy congruence of medical revolu-
tion and legal advance. By dampening public concern over deinstitutionali-
zation, the lawsuits turned Birnbaum's dream into his nightmare, and then
turned both into reality. With medications and deinstitutionalization thor-
oughly identified with progress, no one noticed the difference.
II. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATIONS
In the mid-1970s, another type of mental hospital class action ap-
peared- the "right to refuse medications" suit. This "right to refuse" rested
on a conventional legal ground: the prerogative of each competent person to
decide on his or her own medical treatment.43 Since few institutionalized
patients had been declared incompetent, they arguably retained that right.
Moreover, if an incompetent patient needed a guardian, common principles
pointed to the selection of someone other than a hospital physician in order
to avoid a conflict of interest. And, even if a patient was incompetent, little
precedent allowed states to assume control over a person's biological func-
tioning.'M
Precedent did exist for forcing medications, but not the kind that would
attract contemporary support for the practice. After World War II, state
hospitals had forced therapies such as lobotomy and insulin coma therapy
with little if any legal formality. 5 Yet those therapies seemed disreputable
in the medication era. Thus, past practice suggested, if anything, that psy-
chiatrists should not have power to force the prevailing treatment of the
time.
The virtual absence of legal activity in the early 1970s seems remark-
able with medications so widely used and so disliked by patients, and with
arguments in favor of a right to refuse so substantial. At the time, courts
and legislators were recognizing a right to refuse less common treatments
such as lobotomy and electroconvulsive therapy. Many supposed that
courts would do the same for medications. Among them was Alan Stone, a
Professor of Law and Medicine at Harvard, who prophesied that courts
43. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that hospitalization per se did
not render a person incompetent). See generally Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say
No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283
(1992), for a comprehensive survey of the right to refuse medications litigation.
44. See generally Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1203, 1294 (1995) [hereinafter Biological Alteration] (arguing that prior to 1990 the
Supreme Court had never sustained a state biological intervention that caused the "serious,
widespread side effects" that medications do).
45. Regarding this era in psychiatry, see ELLIOT S. VALENSToN, GREAT AND DESPERATE
CURES: TiE RisE AND DECLINE OF PSYCHOSURGERY AND OTHER RADICAL TREATMENTS FOR
MENTAL ILLNESS (1986).
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would recognize the right to refuse.' Moreover, some state Attorneys Gen-
eral supposed that the right already existed, though the state hospitals typi-
cally acted as though it did not.'7 And when a federal appellate court first
addressed the issue squarely in 1975, it strongly suggested that mental pa-
tients possessed the right. That case was a pro se action by a mentally ill
man who had killed his grandmother. In a nation with a sizable mental
health bar and a burgeoning docket of lawsuits over mental hospitals, he
was arguably the leading litigator of medication issues.
Despite the right's evident doctrinal support, it received almost no at-
tention. The leading law and psychiatry text in 1974 could cite only four
right to refuse medication cases.' Two were petitions by individual prison-
ers objecting to a federal penitentiary's practice of forcing medications; one
prisoner represented himself, and both lost in 1968."9 At about the same
time, a Michigan woman successfully sued for monetary damages after a
physician forcibly medicated her during her "temporary" commitment in a
private psychiatric hospital. The plaintiff s estranged husband had her con-
fined under questionable circumstances, and the Michigan Supreme Court
held both that a "husband can[not] force medical care upon his wife"50 and
that "private psychiatric hospitals lacked the power that public institutions
had to force treatment on temporarily committed patients."5 None of these
three lawsuits evidenced the kind of reformist impulse that animated right to
treatment cases. None was a class action, or involved a state mental hospi-
tal, or came from the kind of non-profit, legal reform organization that
brought right to treatment suits.
The fourth medication case, Winters v. Miller,52 was different. Filed in
the late 1960s, it involved a state mental hospital defendant and the New
York Civil Liberties Union (a reformist legal organization).' Bruce Ennis,
the Civil Liberties Union attorney who represented Ms. Winters, went on to
play a leading role in the first class action right to treatment case, Wyatt v.
Stickney, and later became the country's best known litigator in mental hos-
46. See Alan A. Stone, Recent Mental Health Litigation: A Critical Perspective, 134
AM. I. PSYCHIATRY 273 (1977); see also Alan A. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why
Psychiatrists Should and Can Make it Work, 38 ARcHIVEs GEN. PsYcHIATRY 358, 358 (1981)
(observing that "once the issue was presented to the courts the result was almost inevitable").
47. For example, the Massachusetts Attorney General did not object to a federal court
restraining order in 1975 that barred forcible medication in state hospitals; presumably, the
Attorney General believed forced medication was prima facie illegal. See Rogers v. Okin,
478 F. Supp. 1342, 1353 (D. Mass. 1979) (describing the case's procedural history).
48. BRoOKs, supra note 2, at 897.
49. See Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Veals v. Ciccone, 281 F.
Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (prisoner represented himself).
50. Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Mich. 1971).
51. Id. at 362 (distinguishing instances in which treatment is "necessary to keep a person
on the premises or to prevent harm to the patient or to others").
52. Winters v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
53. See id.
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pital reform cases.' Based on Winters, one might have foreseen medication
refusal, not the right to treatment, as the most important issue in future re-
form litigation.
In Winters, a New York mental hospital had forcibly treated a tempo-
rarily committed woman, who had not yet had any type of court hearing,
and who had asserted religious reasons for refusing treatment.5 The woman
sued for damages, but in 1969 the trial court dismissed her complaint on the
ground that the hospital had the right to force treatment. In 1971, the Sec-
ond Circuit overturned that conclusion and remanded the case for trial.'
The appellate court's reasons were not entirely clear; at a minimum, it ap-
peared that a non dangerous, temporarily committed person should have a
judicial commitment hearing before the hospital forced medications, at least
when the patient's objection rested on religious grounds.'
Despite this success, Winters did not spawn other challenges to forcible
medication. Indeed, Bruce Ennis soon described the case as primarily about
the rights due to religious believers in mental hospitals, and not as a chal-
lenge to the prevailing biological therapy in psychiatry. 8 Beyond that,
Winters relied almost entirely on legal abstractions in reaching its result,
rather than on the nature of medications. Thus, neither the appellate court
opinion nor Ennis' later account of the litigation said anything about the
medications' benefits or risks, or about the medical reasons why someone
might refuse them. The court's opinion treated "medications" as an indis-
criminate category with a fungible membership, noting only that "for the
most part" the drugs Ms. Winters had received consisted of "rather heavy
doses of tranquilizers."59 Had the hospital forced Ms. Winters to take an as-
pirin or an allergy pill, it appeared that the analysis would have remained
the same: the issue was "medications" in general, not the particular drugs
that the states and psychiatrists now favored. Whether the medications
caused permanent neurological changes or distress seemed irrelevant.
In retrospect, this aspect of Winters, and of the other medication cases
before 1975, seems as surprising as any development during this period. As
noted above, psychiatry was already in ferment over Crane's findings of
widespread tardive dyskinesia, and the Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation had already editorialized about the dangers of permanent side ef-
54. Ennis described his work for the New York Civil Liberties Union on behalf of men-
tal patients in BRUCE ENNis, PRIsoNERs OF PSYCHIATRY; MaAL PATET, PSYCHIATRisTs,
AND THs LAW (1972) (his account of the Winters case appears in pages 128-44; the plaintiff,
Miriam Winters, is given the pseudonym 'Mary Summers").
55. See Winters, 306 F. Supp. at 1160.
56. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2nd Cir. 1971).
57. For discussion of the uncertainties in the Winters opinion, see Gelman, Mental Hos-
pital Drugs, supra note 1, at 1728 n.27.
58. See ENNis, supra note 54, at 128-44 (describing the case).
59. Winters, 446 F. 2d at 68.
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fects.6 Yet, none of that ferment or that concern managed to penetrate the
world of lawyers, courts and rights.
Nor did that change as the right to refuse medications came of age dur-
ing the mid and late 1970s. Two class actions, Rogers v. Okin6' and Rennie
v. Klein," became the prototypes for "right to refuse" litigation. Both repre-
sented the work of law reform agencies and both named state mental hospi-
tals as defendants. These cases attracted enormous attention from lawyers
and psychiatrists, and even produced front page stories in leading newspa-
pers.
The earlier case, Rogers, began in 1975 as a challenge to seclusion
practices and forced medication at Boston State Hospital. Rennie began as
an action by a single patient in 1977, and turned into a class action the next
year. In neither case did the medical ferment over tardive dyskinesia play
much of a role during the early stages of litigation. No named plaintiff in
Rogers had the disorder, or for that matter ever developed it.' Mr. Rennie
became a victim of tardive dyskinesia only after his litigation had begun;
and the possibility it might develop played no role in the decision to file his
lawsuit.6
A decision on the merits of each case appeared in 1979. The Rogers
opinion, like that in Winters, focused on legal abstractions and general legal
rights.' Now, however, the existence of tardive dyskinesia received consid-
erable attention as a factor relevant to the assessment of patients' rights.
The district court noted that "recent studies" had "suggest[ed] that tardive
dyskinesia is more widespread in mental patients than previously [thought]"
and cited psychiatric research estimating that fifty percent or more of
chronic patients, and over forty percent of outpatients treated with medica-
tions developed tardive dyskinesia.' Moreover, although none of the named
plaintiffs had the disorder, "several" defendants conceded that "other pa-
tients" at the hospital did.Y
Rennie dealt in legal abstractions as well, but (to a greater extent than
Rogers) the court record documented the hospitals' actual response to
tardive dyskinesia and other side effects. The results, including George
Crane's testimony, are described above. Although New Jersey hospitals had
never before acknowledged so much as a single case of tardive dyskinesia,
mid-way through the trial they conceded that twenty five to fifty percent in
fact developed it.' The decade-old posture of denying tardive dyskinesia
60. See Editorial, supra note 15.
61. Rogers v. Okin, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
62. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
63. See Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1342.
64. See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1302-13 (D.N.L 1979).
65. See Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360.
66. Id at 1360.
67. Id
68. See id. at 1300 (describing the testimony of the hospital's medical directors).
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had proved impossible to sustain in litigation. What had thrived in the cul-
ture of mental hospital psychiatry simply collapsed when exposed to courts
and outside scrutiny.
Largely in connection with these lawsuits, the national press carried
some of the most critical articles about a prevailing psychiatric therapy to
appear since the era of lobotomy.69 The Rennie judge castigated the hospi-
tals for ignoring tardive dyskinesia and for badly mishandling other side ef-
fects. And new cases began to appear, in much the same way that the first
right to treatment case had spawned copies."
In part because of the litigation, in part because of the media accounts
of it, and in part because of new research reports finding high tardive dyski-
nesia rates, the psychiatric ground shifted. Leaders of the profession now
acknowledged double digit rates of tardive dyskinesia (although the
"consensus" now estimated its prevalence at only about fifteen or twenty
percent) and the old claims that medications did not cause the disorder fell
into disfavor.7' At the same time, many psychiatrists attached less impor-
tance to tardive dyskinesia as a factor in prescribing. Urging clinicians to
carefully weigh the risks against the benefits of medications, leaders of the
profession nonetheless supposed that a decision to continue medication
would be the result of that weighing. Within clinical practice, the profes-
sion's acknowledgment of tardive dyskinesia had virtually no discernible
effect; medications continued to be prescribed at the same or higher doses,
and to as many patients, as before. 2
Nor did legal holdings significantly affect prescribing practice. Differ-
ent varieties of the "right to refuse medications" received recognition in the
cases. Some recognized a nominal right to refuse, but allowed a mental
hospital director or other hospital officials to override the patient's refusal
and force medications. That was the outcome of Rennie. Others recognized
a seemingly more substantial right, requiring that hospitals respect a patient
refusal absent a judicial adjudication of the refuser's incompetence and/or a
judicial assessment of the reasons for and against compelling medications.
After a tortuous course of litigation in federal and state courts, that was the
outcome in Massachusetts, where Rogers had been litigated.' Yet neither
version of the right, nor any in between, significantly affected medication
69. See, e.g., Peter Sterling, Psychiatry's Drug Addiction, NEw REPUBUC, Dec. 8, 1979,
at 14.
70. See generally Cichon, supra note 43 (surveying the cases).
71. See AMERIcANPsYcHIATRICASS'N, supra note 23.
72. See Gerard T. Reardon et al., Changing Patterns of Neuroleptic Dosage Over a Dec-
ade, 146 AM J. PsYCHiATRY 726, 727-29 (1989) (surveying a hospital psychiatric ward, a
community mental health center, and a state mental hospital, Reardon reported that "the over-
all mean dose [of medications] doubled at each center between 1973 and 1982." The study
ended in 1982, but Reardon observed that its results "confirm[ed] ... the impression of many
clinicians and investigators that higher doses of antipsychotics are being routinely used." ).
73. Rogers v. Commissioner of Dept. of Mental Health, 458 N.E. 2d 308 (Mass. 1983)
(answering questions certified by the First Circuit Court of Appeals).
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prescribing or (so far as anyone can tell) the incidence of tardive dyskinesia
and other side effects.
Rennie-type decrees, which allowed hospital officials to override pa-
tients' refusals, could at most guarantee that individual physicians would
conform to prevailing prescribing standards in the hospital. But the pre-
vailing practice entailed medicating virtually all patients, whatever the ac-
tual benefits or side effects in a particular case. That circumstance, rather
than an occasional deviation by an individual physician, produced the high
incidence of tardive dyskinesia. 4 And, as the Rennie trial record demon-
strated, hospitals often found a way to consider medication "voluntary,"
even if that meant threatening to hold the patient down for an injection!'
Despite their substantial court procedures, Rogers-type rights seem-
ingly have had little more effect. In an overwhelming number of cases,
courts uphold the hospitals' power to force the medications. A review in
Massachusetts, for example, found that courts allowed forced medication in
98.6 percent of the cases.76 Moreover, as the psychiatrist Paul Appelbaum
observes, few patients are reported to refuse medications for any substantial
time in the first place.'
Appelbaum himself sees evidence of benefit from both types of court
decree, however. The existence of the right to refuse, he believes, has led to
negotiation between refusing patients and their psychiatrists. Noting that
thirty percent of patients cite side effects as a reason for refusing, Appel-
baum comments that "it should be possible to end many refusals by negoti-
ating..., about the dose and type of medication."78 For example, Appel-
baum cites a study finding that about a quarter of patients reacted to
medications with distress, and he implies that negotiation could alleviate the
problem.79
Although negotiation undoubtedly occurs, Appelbaum's conclusions
are unduly optimistic. For instance, the study of patients who responded to
medications with distress did not claim that changing the dose or the drug
would necessarily eliminate the problem." In many cases, no "negotiation"
will do so; Appelbaum's assumption that a comfortable dose exists for eve-
ryone arises from his views about the law and about what should be done,
not from medical research. Studies other than those cited by Appelbaum
find very high rates of patient dissatisfaction with medication.8" And while
74. See Gelman, Remedies, supra note 27, at 235-40.
75. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (D.N.J. 1979) (noting that patients were
"too intimidated to attempt to refuse medication and would still be ignored [if they tried]").
76. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REvOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE
LIMITS OF CHANGE 143 (1994) (describing the results of a study undertaken by the state).
77. See id. at 140.
78. Id. at 142.
79. See id.
80. See Van Putten & May, supra note 5.
81. See M. Wallace, Schizophrenia-A National Emergency: Preliminary Observations
on SANELINE, 89 AcTA PSYCHIATPJCA SCAND1NAVICA SUPPLEMEVTM 33 (1994) (reporting that
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thirty percent of patients may cite side effects as a reason for refusing, as
Appelbaum says, many more patients than that in fact suffer side effects.
The Yale Tardive Dyskinesia Study estimates that a majority of patients
maintained on medications long-term will develop tardive dyskinesia, alone;
thus, a probable majority of Appelbaum's non-refusing and "negotiating"
patients will probably do so."
Perhaps most importantly, Appelbaum does not suggest that signifi-
cantiy more patients will manage to remain medication-free for any length
of time because of a legal right to refuse medications. The fact that patients
generally will end up on medications gives Appelbaum satisfaction, since he
believes that "it makes no sense to create a system that allows us to hospi-
talize people against their will and then decline to treat them with medica-
tion."'83 Again, that reflects his undefended assumption that the patients
should receive medications, whether they want to or not. Taking the risks of
medication more seriously, one might regret that legal interventions have,
by and large, failed to influence events.
Appelbaum simply assumes that medications benefit almost every seri-
ously mentally ill person, in a medical sense. From that, it follows that ob-
jections to medications must fall into three, somewhat overlapping catego-
ries: (1) those groundless, mad or delusional; (2) those based on legal or
moral concepts of individual autonomy, rather than on medical considera-
tions; and (3) those that result from a particular clinician's failure to find the
optimum drug or dose. Appelbaum himself once vociferously objected to
the right to refuse, in effect treating the legal right itself as something akin
most people taking the medications dislike how the drugs make them feel); Samuel Gershon,
Concluding Summary to the Neuroleptic-induced Deficit Syndrome: Proceedings of the First
International Meeting on the Neuroleptic-Induced Deficit Syndrome, 89 AcrA PsYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA SUPPLEMENTUM 83, 84 (1994) (a psychiatrist observing that "anyone who
takes... [these medications] gets a neuroleptic-induced deficit syndrome: that is, one's head
is fuzzy, it feels as if it is packed with cotton, one cannot think straight, and one cannot do
one's work. I have tried taking these drugs, and it is extremely difficult to get your thoughts
straight").
82. See William M. Glazer et al., Predicting the Long-Term Risk of Tardive Dyskinesia
in Outpatients Maintained on Neuroleptic Medications, 54 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 133, 137-
38 (1993); Hal Morgenstem & William M. Glazer, Identifying Risk Factors for Tardive
Dyskinesia Among Long-term Outpatients Maintained With Neuroleptic Medications: Results
of the Yale Tardive Dyskinesia Study, 50 ARcHIVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 723 (1993).
83. APPELBAUM, supra note 76, at 150. At other points, Appelbaum's analysis reflects
wishful thinking on his part. He is obviously aware that researchers have suggested with-
drawing chronic, hospitalized patients from medications because of the high risk of tardive
dyskinesia and the evidently minimal benefits chronic patients derive from the treatment, at
least in terms of preparing them for release from the hospital. Appelbaum does not describe
this research, but he says it is "possible" that "chronic patients with intractable symptoms"
may "be able to persuade their psychiatrists to respect their desires to decline medication."
Id. at 142-43. No evidence is cited for these "possibilities." Nor does Appelbaum note that
clinicians have ignored the advice about withdrawing medications from chronic patients for a
quarter of a century. How deteriorated, chronic patients would acquire the wherewithal to
persuade clinicians--on a point where leading researchers have utterly failed to affect clinical
practice-remains a mystery.
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to a mad or groundless objection.' He has now moderated his views be-
cause he recognizes more objections of the third kind, which he supposes
will lead to "negotiation" and an optimum dose. And he continues to reject
objections of the second kind (based on moral autonomy) because "it makes
no sense" to commit people and not medicate them.85 Yet all of this as-
sumes that the case for almost universal medical benefits from medication is
clear, and that no moral considerations are intertwined with the medical
judgments.
Both positions are mistaken. Researchers estimate that ten to forty per-
cent of patients do not measurably benefit from medications, yet it is clear
that most of those people receive them anyway. 6 "Right to refuse treat-
ment" litigation did virtually nothing for this group. Even more impor-
tantly, during the 1960s and early 1970s it seemed far from clear that pa-
tients who developed permanent side effects, or were at high risk for them,
should routinely receive medications. The objection to medications in this
case was both medical and moral, and it had vast implications. Among psy-
chiatrists, a widespread assumption existed that if drugs caused such effects,
their use would be (and perhaps should be) curtailed.
Viewed in this light, "right to refuse" litigation legitimated questionable
practices more than it did anything else. The lawsuits greatly contributed to
public and professional awareness of tardive dyskinesia, it is true, but they
also produced broad public acceptance of the idea that permanent neuro-
logical damage from medications did not necessarily rule out treatment,
even forced treatment. Before Rennie and Rogers, it appeared far from ob-
vious that the public would accept even a ten percent tardive dyskinesia
rate. The prospect of public resistance, I believe, explains the refusal of
many researchers and virtually all clinicians to acknowledge the disorder in
the first place. After Rennie and Rogers, however, a fifty percent tardive
dyskinesia rate seemed well within reason-regrettable certainly, but hardly
cause for radical changes in psychiatric practice.'
Without "right to refuse" litigation, the public would have faced a
choice: tolerate widespread permanent side effects of medication or signifi-
84. See Thomas Gutheil & Paul Appelbaum, "Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitu-
tional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCmATRY & LAW 306 (1979).
85. APPELBAUM, supra note 76, at 150.
86. See David Pickar, Prospects for Phannacotherapy of Schizophrenia, 345 LANCEr
557, 557 (noting that "30% to 40% of patients with schizophrenia may have an inadequate or
poor response to traditional antipsychotic neuroleptics"); William T. Carpenter, Jr. & Robert
W. Buchanan, Medical Progress: Schizophrenia, 330 N.E. J. MED. 681, 686 (1994) ("about
10% to 20% of patients have a poor response to antipsychotic drugs, and most patients have
an incomplete response").
87. Indeed, early in the Rennie litigation the trial held that medications could not be
forced if a permanent side effect would result; by the end of the case, however, that restric-
tion disappeared, and Rennie himself received medications involuntarily though the court
acknowledged that he was developing tardive dyskinesia. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131 (D.N.L 1978).
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cantly alter psychiatric practice. With courts ostensibly taking care of the
problem, the necessity for that choice was avoided. What once had seemed
intolerable became, in connection with the lawsuits, a regretted but appar-
ently unavoidable fact of life. Today, psychiatrists remain reluctant to
baldly state that obvious truth. But, no one worries any longer that the
widespread use of medication will change because of tardive dyskinesia.
If "right to refuse" litigation speeded public acceptance of questionable
public health policy, and quieted moral doubts, it was only following in the
footsteps of right to treatment lawsuits. The right to treatment, as noted
above, contributed to social acceptance of deinstitutionalization, thereby
confounding the hopes of its creator. Litigation over treatment refusal sim-
ply enabled society and public decision-makers to accept the means (near-
universal medication) and the incidents (tardive dyskinesia) of that great
transformation in public mental health policy.
To appreciate what actually happened, it is helpful to consider what did
not. No legal case portrayed the high level of side effects or permanent neu-
rological damage associated with medications as wrongs in themselves.
Rennie paid the most attention, but it still cited side effects as a reason for
recognizing a right to refuse-not as a problem or wrong standing alone.
Yet even if a right to refuse had represented as mad an idea as Appelbaum
once thought it did, the extent of medication induced harm still should have
constituted cause for alarm.
No lawsuit contemplated the kind of legal remedy that might have
made a significant difference. No injunction protected against any particu-
lar side effect or required maintaining any number of patients medication-
free. Nor did any court require hospitals to regain the capacity of managing
mentally ill patients without medications-a capacity all but lost with the
pervasive use of medications.
Without such measures, the most robust right to refuse medications left
judges (and patients) facing a stark reality. Since virtually no institution
(community or otherwise) is any longer willing or equipped to deal with
psychotic episodes and not use drugs, the judges who hear individual cases
must consign patients to a hopeless limbo if they uphold the right of refusal.
Not surprisingly, they prefer not to do so. The fact that courts uphold virtu-
ally all applications to force medications reflects this failure of the law, not
any success of medications.
A common view of the preceding era in psychiatry (the era of lobot-
omy) holds that psychiatric interventions then produced too severe conse-
quences. That moral and legal problem survived the shift from lobotomy to
medications. Indeed, medications cause harm on a far wider scale because
of their much more common use. By 1980, however, the law and lawyers
simply refused to recognize that fact. Partly because of this, much of the
public did too.
And so it happened that the main developments in twentieth century
public mental health (deinstitutionalization, near universal medication for
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the seriously mentally il, side effects and permanent neurological changes
on a scale previously unknown in public psychiatry or, for that matter, in
almost any sphere of public activity8) remained largely outside of the law's
attention and concern. The fact that this happened is remarkable. At the
time, a widespread feeling existed that lawyers and courts had psychiatry
under siege, and that law had penetrated to the very core of psychiatric in-
stitutions and practice.
Nor was that the only profound misunderstanding of what was under-
way. Psychiatrists such as Appelbaum complained that litigators and courts
insufficiently appreciated their profession and their science. But that got
things backwards. In fact, organized psychiatry would have faced far more
scrutiny had lawyers taken research findings and conclusions about medica-
tions more seriously. Contrary to the usual claims, it was precisely lawyers'
insufficient appreciation of psychiatry that allowed the profession to stay
the course.
At the heart of psychiatric and legal developments in the 1960s and
1970s lies the modem public health system of small mental hospitals and
short hospital stays, "community" living and near universal prescription of
medications. One can speculate about how legal and medical developments
contributed to this system's realization. Yet it makes more sense, I think to
ask how the emerging public health system shaped developments in psy-
chiatry and law. In the area of medications, the answer is that the system's
imperatives often underlay the actions of lawyers, psychiatrists, and judges.
The course of the legal right to treatment, the psychiatric ignoring of medi-
cations' side effects, the later legal failure to notice medications, the turn in
the courts that allowed states to forcibly medicate past the point of neu-
rologically damaging the patient-all seem anomalous, or at least surpris-
ing, if one thinks of ordinary professional processes in psychiatry and law.
And yet each development advanced the new system of medicating and dein-
stitutionalizing patients. Without widespread medication, deinstitutionali-
zation could not have occurred as it did; and nothing seriously interfered
with it. Neither side recognizes the fact, but lawyers and psychiatrists be-
came soldiers in the same questionable cause.
88. See generally Gelman, Biological Alteration, supra note 44 (observing that, histori-
cally, courts have hesitated to allow states to intervene biologically and cause harm).
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